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‘CRACKS’ IN THE COURT’S ANALYSIS? COURT STRIKES
BALANCING ACT BETWEEN CITIZENS’ CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND GOVERNMENT’S EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL
GAS RESERVES IN PENNSYLVANIA ENVIRONMENTAL
DEFENSE FOUNDATION V. COMMONWEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than fifty years, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
has “struck it rich” in its ability to extract mineral resources, such as
natural gas, from the Marcellus Shale Formation.1 The Marcellus
Shale Formation, located nine thousand feet below Pennsylvania’s
surface, is comprised of rock formations that contain natural gas
within their cracks, which is tapped for consumption.2 Although
the Commonwealth historically engaged in “steady” natural gas development, there recently has been a substantial increase in resource exploration due to technological innovations that more
efficiently facilitate the extraction of natural gas.3 Pennsylvania,
consequently, has quickly achieved its status as one of the country’s
foremost natural gas suppliers.4
1. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (referencing Marcellus Shale Formation). See generally Amber
R. Mondock, Shale I Stay or Shale I Go? Pennsylvania’s “Marcellus Shale-Size” of a Debacle over Fracking Severance Taxation, 13 AVE. MARIA L. REV. 121, 123-24 (2015) (exploring Pennsylvania’s history of using Marcellus Shale Formation as energy
source).
2. See Mondock, supra note 1, at 123-24 (describing components of Marcellus
Shale Formation). “The untapped natural gas within the shale is enough to supply
United States consumption for almost two decades.” Id. at 124 (footnote omitted).
The success of the fracking process involves both vertical and horizontal drilling
into the solid rock formation, “followed by injecting millions of gallons of water
mixed with chemicals and sand at a high pressure to break up the rock, releasing
gas[,] [and] allowing it to flow up . . . to the surface.” Id. at 125 (footnote
omitted).
3. See id. at 124 (relaying technological innovations in hydraulic fracturing
methods). These technological breakthroughs included improvements to the horizontal drilling procedure, which allowed operators to remove larger amounts of
natural gas in a more effective manner. See id. Additionally, since 2009, the state’s
“natural gas production more than quadrupled . . . averaging nearly 3.5 billion
cubic feet per day in 2011.” Id. (footnote omitted); see also Laura C. Reeder, Creating a Legal Framework for Regulation of Natural Gas Extraction from the Marcellus Shale
Formation, 34 WM.& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 999, 1003-04 (2010) (describing
advantages of horizontal drilling for efficient natural gas extraction). The increase
in hydraulic fracturing, due to technological innovations, dually creates property
and environmental concerns. See id. at 1005.
4. See Mondock, supra note 1, at 123-25 (asserting Pennsylvania’s contribution
to nation’s energy exploration).

(329)
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This reinvigorated contact with the environment poses numerous concerns for citizens’ inherent right to enjoyment and protection of the environment, and blurs the line between governmental
boundaries and compliance with property rights.5 Article I, Section
27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, entitled the Environmental
Rights Amendment (ERA),6 guarantees present and future citizens
the right to the state’s “public natural resources,” which the Commonwealth must dutifully safeguard and preserve.7 Beginning in
2008, the state government began leasing state lands to private parties to encourage further natural resource exploration in the
Marcellus Shale Formation.8 Despite generating seven years of astronomical revenue, the Commonwealth fluctuated between
prohibiting further, potentially harmful development on the
Marcellus Shale Formation, and permitting non-destructive, yet
“necessary” exploration on the land.9
In Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation v. Commonwealth,10 several budget-related decisions, stemming from the Commonwealth’s extensive land leasing from 2009 to 2015, became the
center of a legal, environmental, and constitutional dispute.11 In
an attempt to foster the continued leasing of state lands and perpetuate its high revenue, former Governor Thomas Corbett (Governor
Corbett) appropriated “up to [fifty] million” dollars to the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), the cabinetlevel agency tasked with protecting the Commonwealth’s public
natural resources.12 In the 2014 Fiscal Code Amendments, Gover5. For an analysis of how the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court dealt with
the underlying tension between governmental actions and citizens’ constitutional
rights, see infra notes 123-143 and accompanying text.
6. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (declaring citizens’ constitutional right to enjoyment
and preservation of environment).
7. For a further discussion of the history and various interpretations of the
Environmental Rights Amendment, Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see infra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
8. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 143-44 (describing state’s success in
first land lease). “In one month . . . [the] leasing activities generated more revenue than the prior sixty years of leasing activity combined.” Id. at 144.
9. See id. at 144-50 (providing background of Marcellus Shale development
within Pennsylvania). After the first lease of state land in 2008, the government
became concerned with the potential hazards of drilling on the environment for
the next five decades. See id. at 144; see also Mondock, supra note 1, at 122 (referring to effects of fracking). “The dangers of fracking are still not fully understood,
and little if any regulation exists on how the process is conducted.” Id.
10. 108 A.3d 140, 172 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015).
11. For a thorough discussion of the factual background in Pa. Envtl. Def.
Found., see infra notes 23-40 and accompanying text.
12. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 148 (describing governmental appropriation to agency to maintain conservation of state and forestlands).
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nor Corbett transferred ninety-five million dollars of generated
land leasing earnings to the General Fund to balance the Commonwealth’s deficient budget.13
This Note explores the various environmental, constitutional,
and social policy issues surrounding the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania’s decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation.14 In this case, the court upheld the monetary appropriations to the General Fund as passing constitutional muster under
the Environmental Rights Amendment without offending citizens’
constitutional right to environmental preservation.15 The court not
only denied the environmental group’s application for summary relief, but it also condoned the controversial notion that the ERA
serves as a concession of governmental power, not a check on its
unfettered authority.16
This Note also discusses the potential ramifications that the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision will produce on
both the environment and future Pennsylvania decisions that concern challenged governmental actions affecting citizens’ environmental rights.17 Part II of this Note explains the case’s factual
background, its primary issues and arguments, and the court’s holding.18 Part III explores the legal background surrounding the history of the ERA, as well as traditional judicial ability to judge the
adequacy of legislative and executive actions.19 Part IV examines
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s analytical reasoning,
specifically emphasizing Article I, Section 27 interpretation and its
effect on legislative actions to control the maintenance of environ-

13. See id. at 152 (noting significant amount of money Governor Corbett
transferred from Lease Fund to state’s General Fund for budget-balancing purposes); see also 2014 Fiscal Code Amendments, 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1605E(b) (West 2014) (relaying transfer of money to General Fund). The transfer of
money granted by this Section “is [twenty million dollars] more than the transfer
that Governor Corbett proposed in his Executive Budget.” Pa. Envtl. Def. Found.,
108 A.3d at 152.
14. For a discussion of the Petitioner’s various issues presented for the court’s
review, see infra notes 23-36 and accompanying text.
15. For a recitation of the court’s holdings, see infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the court’s legal conclusions, see infra notes 3740 and accompanying text.
17. For a prediction of the decision’s effect on future environmental claims,
see infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the factual background of the case, see infra notes 2340 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the various issues’ respective legal backgrounds and
histories, see infra notes 41-119 and accompanying text.
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mental integrity.20 Part V contributes a critique of the court’s analysis, focusing on both Article I, Section 27 implications and the
court’s failure to sufficiently address Petitioner’s claims due to its
judicial ‘constraint’ in evaluating the constitutionality of legislativeexecutive actions.21 Finally, Part VI addresses the predicted impact
the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision will have on
future environmental decisions and land leasing activities within
the state.22
II. FACTS
On March 19, 2012, Petitioner Pennsylvania Environmental
Defense Foundation (PEDF) initiated a declaratory judgment action against Respondent Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) alleging that the Commonwealth made
unconstitutional budget decisions in leasing state lands to private
parties for oil and natural gas exploration.23 The Commonwealth
cross-motioned for summary judgment against PEDF’s challenges
of previous and future leasing of state lands for these purposes.24
PEDF argued that leasing to private parties through the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s (General Assembly) appropriation of
monies in the Oil and Gas Lease Fund (Lease Fund) to the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR) unconstitutionally infringed upon citizens’ protected rights under the ERA.25
In 2009, the General Assembly and then Governor Edward
Rendell (Governor Rendell) issued the year’s Fiscal Code Amendments, in which Section 1603-E granted “up to [fifty million dollars] from ‘royalties’ in the Lease Fund to DCNR for uses permitted
under the Lease Fund Act[.]”26 Section 1602-E additionally
20. For a discussion of the court’s legal reasoning on certain issues presented
in the case, see infra notes 120-153 and accompanying text.
21. For a critique of the court’s analysis, see infra notes 154-190 and accompanying text.
22. For a further discussion of the impact of the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania’s decision, see infra notes 191-205 and accompanying text.
23. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (providing legal foundation for Petitioner’s action against
Commonwealth). Respondents included not only the Commonwealth, but also
Thomas Corbett in his role as Governor of Pennsylvania. See id.
24. See id. at 140-42 (explaining procedural posture of case).
25. See id. at 154 (describing PEDF’s position that leasing of state lands for gas
and oil exploration violated individual rights granted to citizens under Article I,
Section 27 of Pennsylvania Constitution to enjoy state’s natural resources).
26. Id. at 145 (citation omitted) (detailing Section 1603-E’s appropriation of
monies to DCNR to fulfill purposes of Lease Fund Act); see also 72 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1602-E, 1603-E (West 2009) (displaying Governor Rendell’s amendments
to Fiscal Code).
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granted the General Assembly sole discretion to appropriate funds
from the Lease Fund to the General Fund.27 In 2010, Governor
Rendell signed Executive Order No. 2010-05 (Rendell Executive
Order), which warned of the dangers that current and further drilling would produce on the environment, and enforced a suspension
on future leasing of state lands.28 Four years later, Governor Corbett issued Executive Order No. 2014-03 (Corbett Executive Order), which lifted Rendell Executive Order’s ban, and asserted the
necessity of “‘royalty revenue’ generated by oil and natural gas leasing” to forestland preservation with some exceptions.29
PEDF, in its Second Amended Petition for Declaratory Relief
(Petition), argued that the budget-related decisions from Governor
Rendell’s and Governor Corbett’s respective documents, Fiscal Year
2009-2010 through Fiscal Year 2014-2015, violated the ERA’s constitutionally-promised protections.30 PEDF urged that the drilling
and removal of natural resources, such as gas and oil, from the land
would produce both “immediate and long term negative impacts”
on the environment.31 PEDF raised four arguments concerning the
constitutionality of the legislative and executive actions under the
ERA.32
First, PEDF argued that “all present and future Pennsylvanians”
maintained a right to “the Commonwealth’s scenic and natural resources[,]” pursuant to the ERA, and therefore, extraction of these
27. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160-61 (explaining Section 1602-E’s
appropriation of monies from Lease Fund to General Fund). From approximately
2009 to 2011, “there was a [two billion dollar] shortfall in the Pennsylvania general
fund budget.” Id. at 145; see also 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1602-E, 1603-E (providing 2009 Fiscal Code Amendments).
28. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 148 (explaining significant toll natural
gas and oil development has and will continue to take on land). Governor Rendell
noted, “[I]n the next [ten] to [twenty] years, full development of the gas in the
Marcellus [S]hale [F]ormation . . . currently subject to drilling will result in the use
of more than [thirty thousand] acres for an estimated 1,100 well pads . . . .” Id.; see
also John C. Dernbach, The Potential Meanings of a Constitutional Public Trust, 45
ENVTL. L. 463, 489 (2015) (clarifying that banning of state land leasing still allowed
Commonwealth to receive revenue from previous leasing transactions).
29. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(finding that revenue from leasing of state lands could be used to obtain privatelyowned natural resources, refine state forest and park systems, and obtain conservatory tracts of land); see also Dernbach, supra note 28, at 489 (explaining permission
of state land leasing unless it would lead to environmental degradation).
30. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 154 (explaining how PEDF’s original
petition to court was amended to include current arguments).
31. Id. at 155 (internal quotation marks ommitted) (asserting PEDF’s claims
of drilling’s harmful environmental effects).
32. See id. at 154-55 (analyzing PEDF’s claims and questions presented to
court).
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minerals would inhibit the fulfillment of this right.33 Second, the
environmental organization challenged the adequacy of the General Assembly’s monetary appropriations to DCNR, which was “without any fiduciary analysis of the financial needs of DCNR to meet its
statutory and constitutional responsibilities to conserve and maintain” the Commonwealth’s land.34 Third, PEDF questioned the
ability and authority of the General Assembly to assert itself into
state land leasing decision-making.35 Fourth, the group protested
the appropriation of substantial revenue generated from land leasing in the Lease Fund to the General Fund in order to balance the
Commonwealth’s severe budget deficit.36
On January 7, 2015, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
granted the Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment in
part.37 The court issued four primary holdings: 1) legislative funding to DCNR was adequate, as it was not sufficiently proved to be
inadequate; 2) revenue generated from leasing of state lands did
not have to be used solely toward the continued preservation of
natural resources, pursuant to the ERA; 3) the statute granting the
General Assembly the authority to use monies in the Lease Fund for
natural gas and oil development did not violate the ERA; and 4) the
Oil and Gas Lease Fund did not constitute a trust fund.38 The
court ultimately denied “all other claims subject to the parties’
cross-applications for summary [judgment].”39 Following the issu33. Id. at 154 (highlighting Petitioner’s primary argument under ERA).
34. Id. at 161 (citation omitted) (discussing PEDF’s argument stating monies
appropriated to DCNR by General Assembly fail to aid organization in adequately
fulfilling duties under ERA).
35. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 159-60 (describing PEDF’s contention
that Section 1602-E of Fiscal Code unconstitutionally delegated power to General
Assembly to appropriate monies from Lease Fund). Petitioner claimed that the
authority “should have remained with DCNR as the agency with the scientific and
technical expertise to understand how to best use those resources to enhance and
protect [the] [s]tate parks and forests.” Id. at 159.
36. See id. at 140-45 (illuminating Petitioner’s challenge of governmental appropriation of leasing revenues to balance Pennsylvania General Fund budget).
PEDF also argued that the General Assembly was more concerned with asserting its
authority over monies than with fulfilling its trustee duties in protecting the environment. See id. at 160.
37. See id. at 172-73 (noting court’s conclusion and grant of summary relief
for Respondents on two constitutional challenges).
38. Id. at 140 (expressing court’s holding on various issues of leasing of state
lands for natural gas and oil development).
39. Id. at 173 (asserting valid claims that court considered and decided). The
court denied Petitioner’s request for reargument on February 3, 2015. See id. at
140. The court also explicitly denied addressing Petitioner’s constitutional challenge of past lease sales from 2008 and 2010, as well as the 2010 Anadarko Lease
Sale, because of a lack of indispensable parties to the matter. See id. at 172. Although DCNR asserted that there would be no further lease sales after 2008, it
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ance of the opinion, however, PEDF appealed to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania for relief.40
III. BACKGROUND
Leasing Pennsylvania state lands to private parties for oil and
natural gas extraction has existed for decades.41 Nonetheless, the
creation of various federal acts, constitutional amendments, federal
agencies, and executive orders within recent years has molded the
current state of natural resource exploration and its associated
large revenues.42 Currently, land leasing for these purposes has “increased exponentially” as a result of technological innovations that
facilitate the effortless extraction of natural minerals from the
Marcellus Shale Formation.43 Tension still exists, however, between
the legislative and executive authorities to lease state lands for both
mineral exploration and financial gain, and citizens’ challenges regarding governmental non-compliance with the ERA.44 The potential hazards on the environment that future drilling threatens
require a careful weighing of environmental concerns with social
policies, pursuant to both constitutional judicial scrutiny, and interpretation of precedent.45

quickly changed its position, noting that “th[e] [2010] lease sale is a direct result
of certain line items contained within the budget agreement and fiscal code for FY
2009-10.” Id. at 146. The year’s Fiscal Code proposed generating sixty million
dollars for the General Fund. See id.
40. See Dernbach, supra note 28, at 493 (detailing PEDF’s appeal to state supreme court after loss).
41. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 142 (describing how leasing state
lands for oil and natural gas development is not new occurrence). Since 1947,
DCNR’s antecedent, the Department of Environmental Resources (DER), had
leased state lands to private parties for extraction of natural gas. See id. at 143.
42. See id. at 144 (highlighting how “rents and royalties” generated from land
leasing under Lease Fund Act amounted to 163 million dollars in 2008). Previously, however, generated revenue from land leasing amounted to only 150 million dollars. See id. at 143. By 2010, the government had appropriated
approximately 200 million dollars in revenue to balance its budget through the
leasing of 140 thousand acres of land. See id. at 148.
43. Id. at 142 (noting increase of state land leasing due to improvements in
technological equipment to extract resources).
44. See generally Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 154-55 (highlighting citizens’ concerns over governmental violation of ERA).
45. See generally Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973)
(weighing citizens’ environmental and social concerns with legitimate governmental policy), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
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A. Limited Judicial Scrutiny of Challenged Legislative and
Executive Actions: The Commonwealth’s
Constitutionally “Broad” Authority to Interpret
the Constitution?
Although judicial review of challenged aspects of legislative activities and appropriations to federal agencies is not a recent occurrence, courts have historically remained reluctant to “second guess”
the General Assembly’s actions.46 For example, in Marrero v. Commonwealth,47 individuals, on behalf of the Philadelphia School District, sought declaratory relief against the Commonwealth for
failing to provide sufficient academic funding to local schools.48
The petitioners alleged that the inadequate funding directly violated the General Assembly’s enumerated duties in Article III, Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which asserts that the
legislature must ensure a sufficient public school system that benefits the Commonwealth.49 The court agreed with the Commonwealth that, because the state constitution “squarely [“places the
responsibility for the maintenance and support of the public school
system”] in the hands of the legislature[,] . . . this court [can]not
inquire into the reason [or] wisdom . . . of the legislative policy with
regard to education . . . .”50 The court, consequently, dismissed the
complaint for lack of judicial authority to properly review the
decision.51
In Mental Health Association in Pennsylvania v. Corbett,52 the
court similarly dealt with complaints of inadequate funding by the
Commonwealth and the limitations of judicial review.53 In this
case, the petitioners, several non-profit advocates of individuals with
mental health disorders, brought suit against Governor Corbett for
46. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 166 (explaining traditional judicial hesitancy to question General Assembly’s actions).
47. 709 A.2d 956, 966 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998), aff’d, 739 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1999).
48. See id. at 957-58 (laying foundation for petitioners’ challenges to General
Assembly’s actions).
49. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14 (mandating General Assembly’s funding for public education system); see also Marrero, 709 A.2d at 958 (explaining petitioners’ arguments pursuant to Article III, Section 14 of Pennsylvania Constitution).
50. Marrero, 709 A.2d at 965 (citation omitted) (explaining judicial inability to
define what constitutes sufficient funding for public school system). The court
noted that issues, such as funding to academic institutions, “are matters which are
exclusively within the purview of the General Assembly’s powers, and they are not
subject to intervention by the judicial branch of our government.” Id. at 965-66.
51. Id. at 966 (emphasizing reasoning for dismissal and holding of court).
52. 54 A.3d 100, 104 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012).
53. Id. at 104 (describing court’s limited authority to decide how General Assembly allocates its funds, partly due to separation of powers doctrine).
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cutting funding to the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) by
twenty percent.54 These entities alleged that the legislative branch
violated its duties under the Mental Health and Intellectual Disability Act of 1996, which required that the General Assembly appropriate adequate funds to DPW for administration of mental health
services.55 The court, however, recognized that pursuant to Article
VIII, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the General Assembly’s appropriation of funds derives from “available revenues
and surplus.”56 The court also noted that the General Assembly has
a duty to balance the Commonwealth’s budget.57 Ultimately, the
court found that the governor “was well within his constitutionallygranted powers” to decrease funding in order to balance the
budget during a period of severe financial depression.58 Given that
the General Assembly’s authority encompasses discretion to decide
“how statutory budget obligations will be satisfied, . . . [t]here is no
authority for this Court to insert itself into that process.”59 The
court consequently dismissed the complaint for lack of non-justiciable questions for review.60 Based upon precedent, Pennsylvania
courts have assumed a traditionally passive role toward questioning
legislative monetary actions, highlighting a constraint in judicial
scrutiny and a lack of effective redress for concerned citizens.61

54. Id. at 102-03 (detailing parties to suit). Governor Corbett submitted his
proposed budget that cut funding to DPW for mental health services and appropriated funding into a Block Grant that prevented DPW from holding monies. See id.
at 103.
55. See id. at 102 (explaining petitioners’ primary argument against Commonwealth for inadequate funding).
56. Id. at 103 (highlighting court’s reliance on Pennsylvania Constitution in
determining constitutionality of legislative and executive actions).
57. Mental Health Ass’n, 54 A.3d at 105 (asserting discretionary right of Commonwealth to use funds for state purposes, such as balancing deficient budget).
The court held, “the General Assembly . . . ultimately determines how statutory
budget obligations will be satisfied . . . .” Id.
58. Id. 54 A.3d at 105 (illuminating court’s justification of government’s
actions).
59. Id. (explaining court’s reasoning why judicial review of government’s actions is unwarranted).
60. See id. at 106 (describing court’s holding and reasoning for dismissal of
complaint).
61. For a further discussion of the Pennsylvania courts’ historical lack of inquiry into legislative actions, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
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B. The “Self-Executing” Environmental Rights Amendment to
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Public
Trust Doctrine
In 1971, Congress passed Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which proclaims that “[t]he people have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic[,] and esthetic values of the environment.”62 It
subsequently provides in its second and third clauses that “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all
the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these
resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them
for the benefit of all the people.”63 Thus, the ERA conveys two distinct yet intertwined constitutional roles: a citizen’s right to historic
and scenic environmental preservation, and the Commonwealth’s
duty, as trustee, to maintain these natural resources.64 A sufficient
action under the ERA “may proceed upon alternate theories that
either the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights or the
government has failed in its trustee obligations, or upon both
theories. . . .”65
In Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,66
decided in 1973, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania handed down
one of its most controversial decisions affecting citizens’ environmental rights under Article I, Section 27.67 The Attorney General,
representing the Commonwealth, brought suit against a corporation seeking to build a 307-foot tall observation tower near a historic site, triggering the first clause of the ERA’s protection of
62. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (asserting rights of people to use and enjoy environment’s public resources). In 1969, Franklin Kury, a state legislator, proposed the
ERA to the Pennsylvania Constitution; see also John C. Dernbach & Mark
Prokopchak, Recognition of Environmental Rights for Pennsylvania Citizens: A Tribute to
Chief Justice Castille, 53 DUQ. L. REV. 335, 335-36 (2015) (explaining history of ERA
interpretation).
63. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (explaining Commonwealth’s role as trustee of
state’s natural resources). The Pennsylvania Constitution states, in part, that “each
branch of government [must] consider in advance of proceeding the environmental effect of any proposed action on the constitutionally protected features.”
Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 952 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
64. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 337 (summarizing purpose
and rights under ERA).
65. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950-51 (addressing elements of Article I, Section
27 claim).
66. 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
67. See generally id. (detailing non-binding ruling that ERA is not selfexecuting).
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citizens’ right to historic preservation.68 Before the case reached
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. National
Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc.,69 the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania first reasoned that the Amendment was self-executing
and did not require additional legislation for enforcement.70 On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania rejected the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s self-executing arguments, finding instead that the ERA is not self-executing because it created
additional constitutional concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.71 The court determined that the
ERA needed additional legislation to “define the values which the
[A]mendment seeks to protect and to establish procedures by
which the use of private property can be fairly regulated to protect
those values.”72 Although the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania disagreed with the lower court’s opinion of the Amendment’s self-executing nature, the lower court’s decision still constitutes binding
precedent since the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania failed to reach
a majority decision.73
That same year, in Payne v. Kassab (Payne I),74 the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, sitting en banc, addressed a citizen
class action lawsuit to terminate a governmental project to widen
streets, which entailed eradicating portions of historical and public
land.75 The petitioners urged that the project violated both Act
68. See id. at 589-90 (providing foundation for lawsuit and applicability under
ERA).
69. 302 A.2d 886 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973).
70. See id. at 892 (holding Article I, Section 27 to be self-executing). The
court emphasized that in cases involving “injury of historic and esthetic values of
the environment,” plaintiffs must successfully prove harm “by clear and convincing
evidence.” Id. at 894.
71. See Nat’l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 594-95 (rejecting lower
court’s ruling on self-executing nature, but affirming overall holding that construction near historic site did not violate ERA).
72. Id. at 595 (explaining need for supplemental legislation to make ERA protections effective).
73. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 340-41 (recognizing binding decision of Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania that ERA is self-executing).
Due to the confusion the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision has caused,
based on its inability to reach a majority, the fact that the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania’s decision is still binding “was often lost on subsequent courts, which
held that [A]rticle I, [S]ection 27 does not apply unless the General Assembly says
so.” Id. at 341. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision has consequently
contributed to the viewpoint that the ERA serves as a concession, not check, of
governmental power and autonomy. See id.
74. 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973), aff’d, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
75. See id. at 88 (detailing nature of construction and petitioners’ procedural
actions); see also Payne v. Kassab, 361 A.2d 263, 264 (Pa. 1976) (reiterating petitioners’ claims on appeal).
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120, which banned construction on such sites if there existed another viable, less damaging option, and their constitutional rights
under Article I, Section 27.76 The court, however, realized the “difficult[y] [of] imagin[ing] any activity in the vicinity . . . that would
not offend the interpretation of Article I, Section 27. . . .”77 It subsequently held that the ERA “intended to allow the normal development of property in the Commonwealth, while at the same time
constitutionally affixing a public trust concept to the management
of public natural resources of Pennsylvania.”78
Applying a now widely criticized three-pronged test, the court
reasoned that, under the ERA, the project’s public benefits outweighed environmental concerns, as Respondents sufficiently
proved that construction would reduce potential environmental
hazards by replanting trees and reusing existing environmental
landmarks.79 The test comprised the following prongs: 1) adherence to statutes that functioned to preserve resources; 2) “reasonable effort[s]” to minimize harmful environmental ramifications;
and 3) a balancing of negative impacts and potential benefits.80
Applying this test, the court dismissed the complaint, concluding
that the project passed constitutional muster under both Article I,
Section 27 and Act 120.81 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Payne v. Kassab (Payne II),82 affirmed the lower court’s
decision.83 The court emphasized that the Commonwealth upheld

76. Payne, 312 A.2d at 94 (listing petitioners’ challenges to Respondents’ construction project).
77. Id. (citation omitted) (analyzing difficulties in abiding by ERA).
78. Id. (balancing by court of social and constitutional rights associated with
public land, and Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of public natural resources); see
also Dernbach, supra note 28, at 463 (stating courts’ ignored meaning of ERA and
its public trust doctrine for decades). Critics of precedential interpretations of the
ERA note that “[t]he Amendment had been so thoroughly buried by judicial decisions that most lawyers had never given the text much thought.” Id.; see also Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State Environmental Rights
Laws: A Case Study, 45 ENVTL. L. 431, 461 (2015) (explaining union between ERA
clauses and need for them to “work together” to conserve and maintain environmental resources).
79. Payne, 312 A.2d at 95 (illustrating state government’s plan to minimize
environmental hazards and drastic change to historic site during construction).
80. Id. at 94 (applying three-part test in assessing Commonwealth’s actions).
81. See id. (expressing court’s holding in favor of Commonwealth).
82. 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976).
83. Id. at 273 (deciding constitutionality of Commonwealth’s actions as trustee); see also Pa. Envtl Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 158 (noting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s affirmation on appeal did not automatically insinuate agreement with
three-pronged test).
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its duties as trustee under Article I, Section 27, as the alterations to
the historical site were minimally intrusive.84
The court reasoned that although citizens possessed an inherent right to enjoy esthetic and historical values associated with the
environment, that right “create[d] no automatic right to relief.”85
The fine line between an individual’s constitutional rights and right
to remedy highlights the balancing test that the courts have employed to ensure adherence with Article I, Section 27.86 Critics,
however, have condemned this balancing test for its ignorance of
the “history, purpose, and text” of the ERA.87 The court’s “substitution of a three-part balancing test for the text of [A]rticle I,
[S]ection 27 is not simply an activist reading of the text of the
[ERA]; it steps outside the realm of what judges are supposed to
do.”88 The contentious test would later be challenged and subsequently rejected in a landmark 2013 Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decision.89
C. The Conservation and Natural Resources Act and Creation of
the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources:
An Environmental Safeguard
In 1995, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Conservation and Natural Resources Act (CNRA) to uphold the provisions of the ERA in ensuring preservation of the state’s natural
resources for citizens’ inherent right to enjoyment and use.90 To
achieve this goal, the Department of Environmental Resources
(DER) became the Department of Environmental Protection
84. Payne, 361 A.2d at 273 (affirming lower court’s ruling in favor of
Commonwealth).
85. Id. (distinguishing between citizens’ constitutional rights and standard of
relief).
86. For a further discussion of the courts’ balancing of citizens’ constitutional
rights and the government’s right to economic development, see supra notes 62-89
and accompanying text.
87. Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 338 (noting disadvantages of
Payne’s three-part balancing test for citizens’ rights). Due to this test, “the environmental plaintiff or petitioner has almost never succeeded. . . . [T]his test . . . is not
only a remarkable example of a court substituting its own rule for that in the constitution; it has also had the effect of demonstrably and significantly limiting public
rights.” Id.
88. Id. at 343 (footnote omitted) (highlighting court’s illicit overreach of its
judicial authority in creating balancing test).
89. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 965-67 (rejecting Payne three-part test on
how to interpret ERA). The plurality opinion in Robinson Twp. criticized the test as
inappropriate for analyzing a statute’s constitutionality. See id. at 967.
90. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 142 (noting passage of Act to ensure
conservation of state forest and park lands).
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(DEP), and the Act created DCNR to champion the protection of
state forestlands and parks.91 Duties of DCNR, a cabinet-level
agency, include maintenance and conservation of state forestlands
to ensure environmental growth and sustainability.92 The Lease
Fund, containing “all rents and royalties from gas leases on Commonwealth lands,” granted DCNR discretion to use funds for “conservation, recreation, dams, or flood control. . . .”93 Additionally,
DCNR possesses the sole discretion to enter into land leasing contracts with private parties, while taking into account the best interests of the Commonwealth.94
In Belden & Blake Corp. v. Commonwealth,95 however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania illuminated limitations on DCNR’s
conferred, discretionary authority.96 A private company that owned
several oil and natural gas properties and planned to construct gas
wells on parklands brought action against the Commonwealth for
enforcing a “coordination agreement” on their activities.97 DCNR
argued that, pursuant to its fiduciary role as trustee of the Commonwealth’s resources under the ERA, its discretionary actions in
controlling surface conditions were not only permissible, but consti-

91. See id. (describing purpose of creation of DCNR in upholding CNRA and
ERA).
92. Conservation and Natural Resources Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1340.101(b)(1) (West 1995) (enumerating intent of CNRA in creating new department to spearhead environmental efforts). The CNRA describes the extent of
DCNR’s constitutional obligations as follows below:
The primary mission of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources will be to maintain, to manage [s]tate forest lands to assure their
long-term health, sustainability and economic use, to provide information on Pennsylvania’s ecological and geological resources and to administer grant and technical assistance to programs that will benefit rivers
conservation, trails and greenways, local recreation, regional heritage
conservation and environmental education programs across
Pennsylvania.
Id.
93. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 140-43 (citation omitted) (demonstrating how revenue from gas leases on state land placed into fund must be used for
conservation and beneficial environmental purposes only, pursuant to DCNR’s authority); see also Oil and Gas Lease Fund Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1331-1333
(West 1955) (describing purpose of Act and allocation of monies).
94. See Conservation and Natural Resources Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1340.302(a)(6) (West 1995) (explaining discretion granted to DCNR to enter
into contracts with private companies in leasing state lands for oil and natural gas
development).
95. 969 A.2d 528, 528 (Pa. 2009).
96. See id. at 532-33 (enforcing limitations on DCNR’s ability to influence how
private parties use leased land).
97. Id. at 529 (explaining case’s basic facts and petitioner’s cause of action).
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tutional as well.98 Contrary to DCNR’s argument that the ERA confers upon it “broad authority to protect state parks,” the court
reasoned that the agency could not intrude upon a private party’s
rights to land merely because the government owned its surface.99
Thus, the court granted the petitioner partial summary judgment
and held that a contrary holding “would be a departure from our
jurisprudence.”100 The court’s recognition of express limitations
on DCNR’s authority bolstered the notion that both the General
Assembly and Governor act as an ultimate check on the agency’s
power.101
D. Act 13 and Robinson Township v. Commonwealth’s Impact on
Article I, Section 27 Interpretation
In 2012, in response to the astronomical revenues generated
from the extraction of natural gas in the Marcellus Shale Formation, Governor Corbett approved Act 13.102 Act 13 amended the
Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act, which added provisions that prohibited local municipalities’ regulation of gas and oil activities, enforced strict limitations on their development, and implemented
unconstitutional zoning regulations.103
Robinson Township v. Commonwealth,104 perhaps one of the most
influential and recent cases interpreting the ERA, is regarded as the
“recovery” of Article I, Section 27’s original and intended meaning,
as it criticized and rejected the three-part balancing test established
in Payne I.105 In Robinson Township, the petitioners, a group of citizens, brought an action against the Commonwealth, arguing that
Act 13 violated Article I, Section 27, among other Article I provisions that grant citizens property rights.106 Specifically, the petitioners argued that mineral excavation entailed toxic gaseous
98. See id. at 530 (addressing DCNR’s trustee argument pursuant to broad
interpretation of ERA).
99. Id. at 532 (illustrating court’s distinction between subsurface and surface
owners’ land rights).
100. Belden & Blake Corp., 969 A.2d at 532 (providing court’s holding).
101. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160-61 (displaying General Assembly’s and Governor’s check on DCNR authority).
102. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 915 (explaining enactment of Act 13).
103. Id. (listing new provisions that Act 13 added to Title 58, Oil and Gas
Act).
104. 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
105. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 338, 352-56 (explaining
Robinson Twp.’s impact on environment and Payne’s balancing test as constitutionally ineffective).
106. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 936 (detailing petitioners’ primary constitutional challenges of Act 13).
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excretions, noxious fumes, and noise pollution that adversely impacted the environment.107 Furthermore, the petitioners alleged
that the Act denied municipalities “the ability to strike th[e] balance between oil and gas development and the preservation of the
natural, scenic, historic[,] and esthetic values of the environment. . . .”108 The Commonwealth contended that the General Assembly was permitted to use its “broad,” yet non-arbitrary, “police
power” to promote development of valuable natural gas reserves.109
Ultimately, the court reasoned that, because the state maintains an
interest in the wellbeing of its citizens, governmental “police power
[must be used] to promote [the economic] welfare [of the citizens] . . . in a manner that promotes sustainable property use and
economic development.”110
The court also addressed the Commonwealth’s obligation, as
trustee, to prevent environmental harm.111 Certain provisions of
the Act, thus, violated the ERA and were unconstitutional because
they contradicted the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of public
natural resources.112 The court reasoned that Act 13’s elimination
of local government’s involvement in natural gas development
“command[ed] municipalities to ignore their obligations under Article I, Section 27.”113 The decision held Sections 3215(b)(4),
3215(d), 3303, and 3304 to be unconstitutional.114 Section
3215(b)(4) permitted DEP to authorize waivers from specific “statutory protections” to those wishing to operate on gas wells, and Section 3304 restricted the ability of local government to regulate the
oil and gas industry.115 By declaring these acts to be infringements
upon both citizens’ constitutional rights and the Commonwealth’s
107. See id. at 937 (enumerating list of harmful effects fracking produced on
environment and human safety).
108. Id. at 940 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining Act’s denial of
local government’s role in serving as public trustee under ERA).
109. Id. at 933 (explaining Commonwealth’s position regarding General
Assembly).
110. Id. at 954 (citation omitted) (discussing balance of state’s legitimate police power, authority under ERA, and promotion of citizens’ welfare).
111. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (describing Commonwealth’s duties as
trustee of state’s public and natural resources).
112. Id. at 999-1000 (determining unconstitutionality of certain provisions of
Act).
113. Id. at 978 (analyzing General Assembly’s transgression of police power,
which was limited by ERA).
114. Id. at 878-84 (discussing court’s analysis of provisions of Act 13 in dispute
and subsequent failures to abide by constitutional parameters).
115. See id. at 931 (describing purpose of Sections 3215(b)(4) and 3304).
The court stated, “In enjoining Section 3304, the Commonwealth Court [of Pennsylvania] held that the provision violated the citizens’ due process rights by requir-
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obligation to protect the state’s natural resources, Robinson Township represented an unprecedented check on unfettered legislative
authority.116
Robinson Township’s interpretation of the ERA, however, supported by only three justices, consequently constitutes non-binding
precedent.117 Despite its merely persuasive authority, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania’s plurality decision, for the first time, looked
to the history and original intent of Article I, Section 27 in determining portions of Act 13 to be unconstitutional.118 Robinson Township’s influential interpretation of Article I, Section 27 set the stage
for the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s similarly presented
issues, arguments, and decision two years later in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation.119
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania considered various
arguments and relied on precedent in ultimately denying Petitioner’s constitutional claims for summary judgment under the
ERA.120 The primary challenge before the court involved its ability
ing local governments to amend their existing zoning ordinances without regard
for basic zoning principles. . . .” Id.
116. For a further discussion of the legislature’s traditionally recognized authority in deciding funding for the Commonwealth, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
117. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis of citizens’ rights and the
Public Trust Doctrine, see supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text. Although the
court’s decision in Part III of Robinson Twp. is persuasive, rather than binding,
authority, “the plurality opinion is likely to have significant persuasive power, in no
small part because it contains a lengthy, detailed, and thoughtful exposition of the
original meaning and understanding of [A]rticle I, [S]ection 27.” Dernbach &
Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 359.
118. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950 (analyzing meaning of ERA and its
equality to all Article I rights). Chief Justice Castille, representative of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s plurality opinion in Part III of the opinion,
asserted:
The actions brought under Section 27 since its ratification . . . have provided this Court with little opportunity to develop a comprehensive analytical scheme based on the constitutional provision. Moreover, it would
appear that the jurisprudential development in this area in the lower
courts has weakened the clear import of the plain language of the constitutional provision in unexpected ways. As a jurisprudential matter . . .
these precedents [like Payne] do not preclude recognition and enforcement of the plain and original understanding of the [ERA].
Id.
119. For a further discussion of how the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania relied on Robinson Twp. as persuasive authority, see infra notes 134-143 and
accompanying text.
120. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, 108 A.3d 140, 154-55 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2015) (providing Petitioner’s list of issues for judicial review under
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to inquire into the constitutionality of legislative and executive
monetary actions.121 Ultimately, the court emphasized its limited
ability to question the activity of other branches “unless it clearly,
palpably[,] and plainly violate[d] the Constitution, without any
doubts being resolved in favor of constitutionality.”122
A. Addressing Section 1602-E of the 2009 Fiscal Code and the
ERA’s Check on Legislative Actions
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania first balanced the
purpose of the ERA against PEDF’s claim that the General Assembly violated Article I, Section 27 through its appropriation of monies in the Lease Fund for its own, self-serving purposes and only
granting “up to fifty million dollars” to DCNR, thereby placing limitations on the agency’s ability to properly function.123 The court
noted the first clause of the Amendment requires the government
to carefully contemplate the ramifications that the legislation would
have on constitutionally safeguarded environmental resources.124
Additionally, the court, relying on Robinson Township’s plurality interpretation of Article I, Section 27 as non-binding precedent, recognized the interplay between the state and the ERA in that the
Commonwealth maintains a legitimate interest in its citizens’ economic well-being and thus, the ERA protects against the government’s unreasonable, harmful acts to the environment.125 The
court also noted that judging the General Assembly’s motives was
“not part of our constitutional inquiry.”126 Under this analytical
framework, the court first reasoned that, although DCNR’s authority includes protection of state lands, “[it] exists by act of the GenERA and Declaratory Judgments Act). The court noted that PEDF’s arguments
about citizens’ inherent right to enjoy the environment “place the [c]ourt at a
crossroad where the law and policy intersect.” Id. at 154.
121. See id. at 154-55 (explaining heavy burden petitioners bear in challenging legislative actions).
122. Id. at 154 (citation omitted) (emphasizing rule courts use to determine
constitutionality of governmental actions).
123. See id. at 155 (laying foundation for PEDF’s arguments pursuant to
ERA).
124. Id. at 156 (plurality opinion) (quoting Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950-51 (Pa. 2013)) (requiring government to consider potential environmental degradation before enacting laws).
125. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 156-57 (highlighting Commonwealth’s duties as trustee under ERA and its simultaneous ability to economically
develop environment); see also Dernbach, supra note 28, at 490 (explaining Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s admission in beginning of analysis that Robinson Twp. plurality opinion does not constitute binding precedent).
126. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160 (explaining court’s limited role in
interpreting legislative actions and “motives”).
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eral Assembly. . . . [I]t does not exercise that authority to the
exclusion of the General Assembly, the Governor, or even this
Court,” contrary to Petitioner’s argument.127 The General Assembly, therefore, acted within its constitutional discretion to appropriate monies to DCNR to maintain conservation of state parks and
forestlands.128
Furthermore, the court justified the General Assembly’s appropriation of monies from the Lease Fund for its own state purposes
by analogizing this action to its right to grant monies to DCNR to
use within its discretion.129 The court noted, “[W]e do not view it
any less constitutional for the General Assembly, through Section
1602-E, to reassert some control over the use of funds within that
special fund.”130 In interpreting the plain language of Section
1602-E, the court found that the provision did not impede the performance of DCNR’s duties enumerated under the CNRA.131 Considering the heavy burden petitioners bear in challenging legislative
actions, for which the court has limited scrutiny to review, the court
concluded that the General Assembly’s monetary appropriations
did not infringe upon citizens’ rights.132 Consequently, PEDF
failed to show that the Fiscal Code Amendments “clearly, palpably,
and plainly [were] unconstitutional.”133
127. Id. (citations omitted) (clarifying DCNR’s limited vested ability under
General Assembly). Relying on the plurality opinion in Robinson Twp., the court
restated that the ERA grants the status of trustee of the state’s natural resources to
the Commonwealth, rather than DCNR. See id. (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d 901
at 957).
128. See id. at 159-60 (concluding General Assembly did not violate citizens’
constitutional rights by appropriating monies in Lease Fund).
129. See id. at 160 (reasoning General Assembly possesses right to use monies
from Lease Fund for state purposes).
130. Id. (highlighting General Assembly’s ability to direct appropriations of
money within Lease Fund). The court also justified its position by explaining that
the Lease Fund existed fifteen years before the enactment of the ERA to the Pennsylvania Constitution. See id.
131. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160-61 (establishing court’s interpretation of Section 1602-E). The language of Section 1602-E is as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in
section 1603-E, no money in the [Lease] [F]und from royalties may be
expended unless appropriated or transferred to the General Fund by the
General Assembly from the [Lease] [F]und. In making appropriations,
the General Assembly shall consider the adoption of an allocation to municipalities impacted by a Marcellus well.
Id.
132. See id. at 161 (asserting constitutionality of General Assembly’s actions).
133. Id. (noting PEDF’s lack of evidence to support claims). The court also
addressed PEDF’s constitutional challenge of Section 1603-E of the Fiscal Code,
which provided DCNR up to fifty million dollars from the Lease Fund to maintain
state and park land sustainability. See id. PEDF argued the inadequacy of the General Assembly’s appropriation, as it limited DCNR’s capacity to perform its legal
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B. Article I, Section 27 and its Impact on the Commonwealth’s
Duty as Trustee of the State’s Public Natural Resources
Subsequent to its conclusion that the General Assembly did
not violate the ERA by allocating a limited amount of Lease Fund
monies to DCNR, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania next
addressed whether the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee prevented
it from using the generated revenue to balance the state’s deficient
budget.134 The court attempted to find a restriction on how the
General Assembly may use Lease Fund monies by looking to the
text of the ERA itself.135 The court noted that Petitioner’s challenges concerned the ERA’s second and third clauses, which involve the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee to protect the state’s
public natural resources “for the benefit of all people.”136 The
court recognized that, under the ERA, the state possesses a fiduciary commitment to comply with its title as trustee and to dutifully
safeguard the trust’s assets.137
The court, however, confronted a problem in deciding the
scope of the ERA as it related to “public natural resources.”138 In
resolving this issue, the court looked to Robinson Township as guidduties, pursuant to the ERA. See id. The court, however, asserting its ‘limited’
judicial power to determine what constitutes adequate funding, determined that
the General Assembly’s appropriation was not “so deficient that DCNR [could not]
conserve and maintain [the] [s]tate natural resources.” Id. at 166.
134. See id. at 166-67 (laying foundation for PEDF’s trustee argument). Petitioners asserted that the capital within the Lease Fund “must be committed to
furthering the purposes, rights, and protections afforded under the Environmental Rights Amendment.” Id. at 167.
135. See id. at 167 (determining whether limitations exist on General Assembly’s ability to use monies from Lease Fund).
136. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (highlighting Commonwealth’s legal obligations
as trustee of state’s public natural resources); see also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108
A.3d at 167 (explaining purpose of ERA). In the 2014 Fiscal Code Amendments,
the General Assembly found that leasing oil and gas rights to private parties was in
the best interest of the Commonwealth’s people, as the two standards were sufficiently met:
The first criteria is if DCNR, in consultation with the Governor, constitutes strong and effective lease protections, best management practices
and ongoing monitoring programs on the impact of gas operations. The
second criteria is if DCNR maintains a balance of money in the [Lease]
[F]und to carry out [DCNR’s] statutory obligation to protect [s]tate forest and park land and other environmental activities.
2014 Fiscal Code Amendments, 72 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1601.1-E (West 2014).
137. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167 (quoting Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d
at 957) (recognizing Commonwealth’s fiduciary duty toward public natural resources “trust”).
138. See id. (noting lack of explicit definition of “public natural resources” in
Article I, Section 27); see also Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 337 (explaining legislature did not define “public natural resources” because list would
“limit, rather than expand” protection).
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ing precedent, which recognized that the drafters’ lack of explanation for the phrase “fairly implicates relatively broad aspects of the
environment, and is amenable to change over time. . . .”139 The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, espousing Robinson Township’s expansive view of “public natural resources,” determined the
ERA did not explicitly mandate that monies generated from land
leasing be used solely for further conservatory purposes.140 Lacking
explicit language, the court subsequently reasoned that the General
Assembly maintained discretion to use Lease Fund revenue “so long
as the Commonwealth is fulfilling its Article I, Section 27 obligations” by using the monies for the greater welfare of its citizens.141
The court distinguished the present case from Robinson Township by
noting that the latter dealt with the Commonwealth’s legislative
regulation of natural mineral development “throughout the Commonwealth, and not just on Commonwealth-owned lands.”142 Finally, the court dismissed the Petitioner’s argument that the
Commonwealth overstepped its boundaries as trustee, recognizing
that the legislative branch “retain[s] authority to control the fate of
special funds in order to serve the changing needs of the
government.”143
C. Future Leasing of State Lands and Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s
Dissent: The Majority Oversteps its Judicial Boundaries
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania refused to consider
the constitutionality of past leasing to private parties, and instead
addressed the decision-making process regarding future leasing of
139. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167 (citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at
955) (referring to court’s decision to look to Robinson Twp. for guidance on definition interpretation).
140. Id. at 168 (describing court’s interpretation of legislative rights under
ERA).
141. Id. (explaining General Assembly’s discretionary right to use monies to
promote citizens’ welfare).
142. Id. at 169 (distinguishing present case from precedent). The court further noted that the balancing test in Robinson Twp., used to decide the constitutionality of the use of revenue from natural resource development, was not
“necessary” here because the revenue in this case was from the leasing of lands. See
id. at 170.
143. Id. at 168-69 (citing Hosp. & Healthsystem Ass’n of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 77 A.3d 587, 604 (Pa. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing part of court’s holding). The court noted that “the General Assembly[‘s] . . .
appropriate[ion] [of monies]” met the requisite standard of aiding Pennsylvania
citizens. See id. at 169. The court also declared that “[t]he decision to use [s]tate
lands for revenue-generating activities and development lies exclusively within the
Commonwealth’s control.” Id. at 170 (citation omitted).
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state lands in the last part of its opinion.144 Although there had
been no final decision regarding the future leasing of Commonwealth lands, the court believed the discussion to be warranted because of the high probability of continued leasing based on past
financial successes.145 The court then rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that because the ERA did not vest DCNR with
unlimited discretion to make leasing decisions, the Governor may
veto any decision promulgated by the agency.146 The court reasoned that, despite the Governor’s title of Chief Executive, the
CNRA constitutionally granted DCNR the right to create contracts
for the leasing of state lands for extraction of natural minerals.147
The court, however, clarified that while the Governor may have his
own opinion on leasing decisions, it is ultimately up to DCNR to
make agreements, especially because the discussion of future land
leasing remains ongoing.148
Judge Cohn Jubelirer dissented with regard to the court’s analysis of further leasing, notwithstanding her concurrence with respect to the rest of the majority’s opinion.149 Judge Cohn Jubelirer
challenged the court’s ability to address the future leasing of state
lands when no final decision had been rendered, and deemed the
court to have issued an unconstitutional advisory opinion.150 Judge
144. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 169-72 (discussing court’s decision to
address future leasing of state land for oil and natural gas extraction).
145. Id. at 169 (explaining why court addressed issue of future leasing). Respondents, including the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, raised this issue in its
cross-application for summary judgment. See id. The court, in justifying its position to address this ‘non-existent’ issue, asserted that “[o]ne would have to ignore
the history of the Commonwealth’s leasing activities during the Marcellus Shale
era to conclude otherwise.” Id.
146. Id. at 171 (discussing reason for court’s rejection of Respondent’s
argument).
147. See id. (holding CNRA vests DCNR with exclusive power to make leasing
decisions, so long as in best interest of people); see also Conservation and Natural
Resources Act, 71 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1340.302(a)(6) (West 1995) (granting
DCNR discretionary authority). Although DCNR, a cabinet-level agency, “serves at
the pleasure of the Governor,” the ability to execute contracts for sale of land
infers a constitutionally vested right. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 171.
148. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 172 (distinguishing Governor’s rights
from actions that overstep position’s power). DCNR officials must faithfully perform their duties, “even when faced with overwhelming political pressure, perhaps
from the Governor, to act against their better judgment.” Id. Before asserting its
holding, the court cautioned that DCNR must give public notice of future land
leases. See id. at 172; see also PA. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (describing Oath of Office).
149. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 173-74 (Cohn Jubelirer, J., dissenting) (discussing judge’s concurring and dissenting opinion).
150. See id. at 174 (highlighting judge’s concern with majority’s decision to
address future leasing of state lands). Judge Cohn Jubelirer emphasized the necessity of “[j]udicial constraint” in addressing non-existent issues. See id. at 173. She
noted that the “[m]ajority’s concern about ‘the history of the Commonwealth’s
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Cohn Jubelirer emphasized that the Commonwealth’s request that
the court discuss future leasing did not automatically constitute an
addressable concern.151 Here, she asserted that “[w]ithout an actual controversy there is a lack of facts . . . thus, making it difficult
to determine the parameters of the Governor and DCNR’s decision-making authority vis-à-vis oil and natural gas leasing.”152 Ultimately, Judge Cohn Jubelirer criticized the court for lending itself
to deciding an issue that may or may not come to fruition, and labeled this section of the majority’s opinion mere dicta.153
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation represents a critical departure from the traditional one-sided analysis in precedent of Article
I, Section 27 and its accompanying public trust doctrine.154 The
court’s decision not to apply Payne’s “non-textual,” three-pronged
test signified an affirmation of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
decision in Robinson Township, by which the Amendment’s original
intent was “reinvigorated.”155 The court, however, throughout its
analysis, provided unclear bases for both its reasoning and deference to the Commonwealth’s discretion to appropriate monies
from the Lease Fund, so long as it was “for the benefit of all the
people.”156 Despite affirming Robinson Township’s “original meaning” interpretation of the ERA, the court’s decision essentially perleasing activities during the Marcellus Shale era,’ does not create the necessary
controversy to justify a declaratory judgment.” Id. at 173-74 (quoting Pa. Envtl. Def.
Found., 108 A.3d at 169).
151. See id. at 173-74 (distinguishing between addressable issues and those
that fail to create “necessary controversy”).
152. Id. at 174 (explaining challenges of addressing situation that has not yet
created legitimate issue). “[D]eclaratory ‘relief cannot be used in anticipation of
events that may never occur. . . . [T]here must be a real controversy.’” Id. (emphasis
in original).
153. See id. (quoting Citizen Police Review Bd. of Pittsburgh v. Murphy, 819
A.2d 1216, 1222 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003)) (highlighting impossibility of challenging decision not yet rendered).
154. For a further discussion of the court’s interpretation of the ERA’s text,
see supra notes 134-143 and accompanying text; see also Dernbach, supra note 28, at
499 (emphasizing court’s reliance on text of ERA for interpretation purposes).
155. See Dernbach, supra note 28, at 499 (explaining court’s non-adoption of
Payne’s three-pronged balancing test). Although the court refused to utilize the
three-pronged balancing test made available in Payne, “[i]n an earlier procedure
decision . . . the court indicated that Payne would be the applicable test.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Pa. Envtl. Def. Found. v. Commonwealth, No. 228
M.D.2012, 2013 WL 3942086, at *3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013)).
156. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis and reasons asserted for
its conclusions, see supra notes 120-143 and accompanying text. Notably, the Gen-
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petuates substantial governmental, economic development at any
expense, specifically environmental exploitation and
degradation.157
A. The Court’s “Abandonment” of the Payne Test and Modern
Article I, Section 27 Implications
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s implicit refusal to
apply the controversial three-pronged Payne test arguably marks a
trend, beginning with Robinson Township, toward interpreting the
ERA in accordance with its true legislative intent.158 Furthermore,
the court’s adoption of the plain meaning of the ERA’s public trust
doctrine allowed it to re-label the “misunderstood” Amendment as
self-executing and not relying on other legislation to officially enforce it.159 Thus, in analyzing PEDF’s claim that the Commonwealth’s self-appropriations violated its trustee duties, the court
properly looked to the text of Article I, Section 27.160 Whether this
decision, however, coupled with the persuasive authority of Robinson Township’s interpretation of the ERA, signifies the end of the
Payne test for future Article I, Section 27 interpretation remains uncertain.161 Two recent court decisions emphasized the necessity of
a plain meaning interpretation of the ERA, which lends promise
that future cases in Pennsylvania courts involving citizens’ environmental concerns against governmental actions will interpret Article
I, Section 27 similarly.162
eral Assembly is afforded discretion in appropriating monies. See Pa. Envtl. Def.
Found., 108 A.3d at 168.
157. For a complete explanation of the court’s analysis and prediction concerning future leasing of state land, see supra notes 120-143 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of the ERA’s enactment during politically-changing times,
see Dernbach, supra note 28, at 469.
158. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167 (applying public trust doctrine
text to PEDF’s claims). The court, however, noted that because no majority was
reached in Part III of Robinson Twp. to overrule Payne, Payne, along with its threepronged test, is still considered binding precedent. See id. at 159.
159. See id. at 158 (describing self-executing nature of ERA constitutes binding precedent pursuant to past court decisions).
160. See id. at 156-57 (providing full text of ERA).
161. For a further discussion of Pa. Envtl. Def. Found.’s predicted impact on
other Pennsylvania courts’ future use of the Payne test, see infra notes 191-205 and
accompanying text.
162. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167 (using Robinson Twp.’s interpretation of ERA as guiding, albeit persuasive, precedent). See generally Robinson
Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 950-64 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion) (discussing plain interpretation of ERA balanced against Commonwealth’s duty as
trustee).
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Despite construing the ERA in accordance with its plain, legislative intent, parts of the court’s holding evoke concerns over the
preservation of citizens’ environmental rights.163 Primarily, the
court’s emphasis on an individual’s inherent right to question the
Commonwealth’s duty to “prevent and remedy the degradation,
diminution, [and] depletion of [the] public natural resources,” ultimately becomes an illusory promise.164 Although the court departed from prior precedent’s application of constitutionally
questionable tests, its decision solidifies the difficulties and burdens
that challengers face in effectively bringing claims against legislative
and executive actions under Article I, Section 27.165
Although the court strove to strictly interpret the ERA pursuant to its plain text, it failed to consider other intended, yet less
explicit, meanings of the Amendment.166 Analyzing the plain
meaning of the text of Article I, Section 27 in accordance with its
interpretation in Robinson Township, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania rejected the state’s “duty to prevent and remedy the
degradation . . . of our public natural resources” as automatically
implying that all generated revenue from land leasing must be used
to protect the environment.167 The court’s reasoning, however, is
concerning with regard to its assertion that without explicit language mandating that monies be reinvested into conservation, the
General Assembly automatically has discretion under Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution to use it for other purposes.168 A plain meaning interpretation of a text does not necessarily indicate that the absence of express language signifies
163. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167 (providing plain text interpretation of Article I, Section 27 and applying it to Petitioner’s claim). “[I]t is evident
that in ratifying the [ERA][,] the citizens of this Commonwealth intended to place
Pennsylvania’s ‘public natural resources’ in trust and to impose a duty on the Commonwealth, as trustee, to ‘conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people’.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting PA. CONST. art. I, § 27).
164. Id. at 168 (quoting Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957) (referring to Commonwealth’s affirmative duty under ERA).
165. See id. (asserting holding that ERA grants discretion to General Assembly
to fulfill legislative intent). Interestingly, “[o]f the twenty-four reported court
cases where parties raised an [A]rticle I, [S]ection 27 challenge to some type of
governmentally-approved action . . . only a single case held that the benefits of the
government’s action were clearly outweighed by its environmental harm. . . .”
Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 344.
166. For a critique of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s strict interpretation of the ERA, see supra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
167. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 168 (quoting Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at
957) (noting Commonwealth’s obligation to conserve and maintain environmental
resources).
168. See id. (expressing court’s reasoning).
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legislature’s intent to definitively exclude it.169 Just as Article I, Section 27 includes the broad term “public natural resources” to encompass a variety of protected resources, the legislature’s reasoning
that a list of specific resources would “limit, rather than expand”
protection could have been easily applied to the Petitioner’s argument in this case.170 Instead, the court held itself to the mercy of
what the ERA explicitly stated, predicting troublesome consequences for the future of Article I, Section 27 interpretation.171
The denial of each one of PEDF’s contentions, despite being deeply
rooted in constitutional law, strikes a chord consistent with traditional precedent in favor of the Commonwealth in ERA-based
claims.172
B. Cracks in the Majority’s Analysis: A Failure to Sufficiently
Address PEDF’s Claims
Although the court looked to the plain meaning of the ERA in
analyzing PEDF’s claims, it blundered when discussing the constitutionality of Section 1603-E of the Fiscal Code, which appropriated
“up to fifty million dollars” to DCNR to execute its conservationist
duties.173 Instead of evaluating PEDF’s concerns that the General
Assembly illicitly appropriated monies without regard as to how
much DCNR truly required in order to fulfill its obligations under
the ERA, the court refused to even address the issue, asserting that
the funding did not appear to be “so deficient” as to be considered
inadequate.174 The court’s vague attribution to the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania for its reasoning provided no reference to case law
169. See Dernbach & Prokopchak, supra note 62, at 337 (explaining legislative
intent in amending ERA).
170. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (detailing
changes made to proposed ERA); see also Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 167
(citing Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955) (including resources encompassed under
“public natural resources”). According to the plurality opinion in Robinson Twp.,
public natural resources includes “not only state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient
air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are
outside the scope of purely private property.” Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955.
171. For a further discussion of the decision’s predicted impact on the interpretation of Article I, Section 27 rights, see infra notes 191-205 and accompanying
text.
172. For a further discussion of past petitioners’ challenges in succeeding
against legislative and executive actions affecting constitutional rights, see supra
notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
173. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 161-66 (asserting that General Assembly’s appropriation to DCNR was not inadequate, and thus constitutional).
174. Id. at 166 (concluding lack of evidence of General Assembly’s ‘insufficient’ appropriation to DCNR).
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or other interpretive illustrations of how “the amount funded
[could be] so inadequate that it impairs the proper functioning of
the . . . DCNR.”175
The court’s strict interpretation, namely that DCNR funding
was not so deficient that the agency could not “conserve and maintain our [s]tate natural resources,” misinterprets the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania guideline’s arguably broader, plain meaning.176 On its face, the standard simply requires a court to review
whether a certain amount of funding “impairs the proper functioning of . . . DCNR,” not whether, as the court claimed, the agency
was unable to perform its job at all.177 In this sense, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania did not provide the Petitioner with a
fair review of whether a maximum amount of fifty million dollars
could impede DCNR’s ability to satisfactorily preserve the Commonwealth’s public natural resources, pursuant to Article I, Section
27.178
Although the court completed a thorough historical inquiry
into the ability to question the sufficiency of legislative funding, it
failed to adequately address PEDF’s 1603-E argument.179 The
court’s historical “reluctance” to “second guess” the General Assembly’s monetary grants to agencies produced an overly simplistic response that determined the funding to be adequate because it was
not “so deficient” as to be considered inadequate.180 Unfortunately, the court’s reluctance to judge the adequacy of legislative
funding to DCNR perpetuates the ongoing struggle petitioners endure when challenging the constitutionality of governmental
actions.181

175. Id. (citing to Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s guideline on evaluating
legislative funding sufficiency).
176. Id. (asserting judicial reasoning for denying Petitioner’s claim).
177. Id. (applying Supreme Court of Pennsylvania standard to present case).
178. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 166 (refusing to address Petitioner’s
claim of insufficient legislative funding).
179. See id. (expressing court’s holding on constitutionality of Section 1603E).
180. Id. (explaining court’s mixed feelings about judging legislative appropriations to governmental agencies).
181. For a further discussion of past petitioners’ challenges in succeeding in
judicial actions against legislative and executive actions, see supra notes 46-61 and
accompanying text.
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C. Did the Dissent Get it Right? The Majority Creates More
Uncertainty Over Future Leasing of State Lands
By promulgating an advisory opinion about the future leasing
of state lands, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania overstepped its judicial boundaries.182 Throughout the entire opinion,
the court appeared hesitant, ultimately refusing to judge the “wisdom, reason [and] expediency” behind the adequacy of the General Assembly’s appropriations.183 The court failed to sufficiently
address legislative funding to DCNR to maintain and conserve natural resources by limiting its inquiry to “insur[ing] that the enactment does not transgress some specific constitutional
prohibition.”184 Because the General Assembly constitutionally possesses discretion to appropriate monies, the court decided that
there were no constitutional breaches in this case.185
While the court assumed a passive stance toward injecting itself
into legislative affairs, it directly addressed the future of state land
leasing, a non-contested issue, albeit one which the Commonwealth
raised in its cross-application for declaratory relief.186 Judge Cohn
Jubelirer’s dissent is valid in asserting the lack of an actual dispute
at the time the lawsuit was brought, as well as the unconstitutionality of courts providing advisory opinions.187 The dissenting opinion’s reliance on precedent illustrates that relief cannot be sought
for events that have not occurred, or are even likely to occur, such
as the future leasing of state lands in this case.188 If the court was
able to effectively inquire into both DCNR’s ability to execute future, non-existent contracts, and its duties pursuant to Article I, Section 27, then perhaps it could have more thoroughly evaluated the
constitutionality of the General Assembly’s budget-balancing ac182. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 173-74 (Cohn Jubelirer, J., dissenting) (criticizing court for issuing advisory opinion).
183. Id. at 160 (quoting Commonwealth v. Sutley, 378 A.2d 780, 782 (Pa.
1977)) (emphasizing judicial constraint in analyzing legislative actions). For a
thorough discussion on the court’s analysis, see supra notes 120-153 and accompanying text.
184. Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160 (quoting Sutley, 378 A.2d at 782)
(explaining permissible judicial inquiry of legislative enactments).
185. For a thorough discussion on the court’s analysis and conclusions, see
supra notes 120-153 and accompanying text.
186. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 169 (Cohn Jubelirer, J., dissenting)
(addressing likelihood of future leasing of land).
187. See id. (arguing mere concern over future leasing and impact on environment does not give rise to legitimate controversy).
188. See id. at 174 (expressing lack of present disagreement over further
leasing).
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tions under the ERA.189 Ironically, these cracks in the court’s analysis illuminate a lack of judicial ‘constraint’ and arguable overreach
in addressing the future leasing of lands for oil and natural gas
exploration.190
VI. IMPACT
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision in Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation seemed to optimistically
foreshadow continued leasing of state lands to private parties, despite acknowledging the toll that natural mineral extraction has
and will continue to inflict on the environment.191 Two weeks after
the court handed down its opinion, however, current Governor
Thomas Wolf (Governor Wolf) took office.192 Governor Wolf’s
2015 Executive Order effectively nullified Governor Corbett’s 2014
Executive Order and restored Governor Rendell’s 2010 ban on future leasing of state lands, “subject to future advice and recommendations made by DCNR.”193 Although the court expressed its
opinion on the high probability of future land leasing, Governor
Wolf’s reinstated moratorium leads the Commonwealth back on a
path to better protect, conserve, and maintain environmental integrity, pursuant to the ERA.194
While Governor Wolf’s prohibition may temporarily curtail the
substantial oil and natural gas development on state lands, the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s decision creates uncertainty over the interpretation of Article I, Section 27 and its effect
on governmental authority to make environmentally-impactful decisions.195 The court’s holding on the constitutionality of the General Assembly’s budget-related decisions and monetary
appropriations to DCNR exacerbates the exploitation of public natural resources and the burden petitioners bear in questioning legis189. For a further discussion of Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s concurrence in the
majority’s opinion, as well as dissent in part of its holding, see supra notes 144-153
and accompanying text.
190. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 173 (Cohn Jubelirer, J., dissenting)
(addressing need for judicial constraint when discussing other branch’s actions).
191. See id. at 169-72 (majority opinion) (expressing opinion that future leasing will most likely occur based on fiscal appropriations).
192. Dernbach, supra note 28, at 492 (noting timing between court’s decision
and election of Governor Wolf).
193. Id. (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing
Wolf’s recent election as Pennsylvania Governor).
194. See id. (predicting Governor Wolf’s environmental impact on future leasing of state lands).
195. For a further discussion of the court’s analysis of Article I, Section 27, see
supra notes 158-190 and accompanying text.
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lative actions.196 The court’s tolerance of legislative interference
with the environment, unless “clearly [and] palpably . . . violat[ing]
the Constitution,” condones the heavy burden challengers have historically assumed in objecting to governmental actions.197 Although the court looked to the self-executing meaning of the ERA,
its broad interpretation of discretion inherently granted to the government foreshadows a slippery precedent of too easily giving the
Commonwealth’s actions the benefit of the doubt.198
Furthermore, despite the right of Pennsylvania’s citizens to
question the state’s activities in preventing environmental degradation, the court’s stringent stance on limited judicial inquiry into executive-legislative actions will arguably resurface in future cases
within the court’s jurisdiction.199 By reiterating the history and examples of the court’s constrained power to judge the sufficiency of
legislative and executive funding, the court bound itself to this
traditional notion and implicitly encouraged the judiciary to continue doing so.200 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s refusal to inject itself into this particular inquiry, while demonstrating
a willingness to discuss the future leasing of state lands, creates an
unstable example for future cases.201 The court’s choice to divulge
the latter discussion perhaps reveals the judiciary’s implicit support
for the leasing of state and forestlands for the extraction of natural
minerals.202
Whether future courts will follow the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania in neglecting to apply the subjective, three-pronged
Payne test is undetermined.203 Regardless, based on the court’s
compliance with the 2013 plurality interpretation in Robinson Township, the first case to criticize the test as “non-textual” and narrow,
there is promise that similar, future constitutional issues will be ad196. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 172-73 (asserting court’s
conclusions).
197. Id. at 154 (explaining legal foundation for deeming legislative act
unconstitutional).
198. For a critical analysis of the court’s affirmation of governmental authority, see supra notes 158-172 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion on the legal background of judicial scrutiny into legislative and executive actions, see supra notes 46-61 and accompanying text.
200. See Pa. Envtl. Def. Found., 108 A.3d at 160-66 (providing historical background for limited judicial scrutiny).
201. For additional information about the court’s issuance of an “advisory
opinion,” see supra notes 144-153 and accompanying text.
202. For further discussion on the court’s analytical reasoning of the
presented issues, see supra notes 120-153 and accompanying text.
203. See Dernbach, supra note 28, at 497-500 (discussing shortcomings of test
and inapplicability in analyzing governmental actions).
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dressed by looking to the ERA’s legislatively intended meaning.204
Although binding precedent has not yet overruled Payne and its
controversial test, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s implicit support of returning to the “original meaning” of the ERA in
Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation creates a powerful precedent for future interpretation of Article I, Section 27.205
Gabriella T. Soreth*
204. Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 967 (Pa. 2013) (plurality
opinion) (criticizing narrow application of Payne test).
205. For a discussion of the court’s emphasis on the ERA’s plain meaning, see
supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2014, Saint Joseph’s University.
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